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I had the distinct pleasure of spending a few hours with Umair Haque last week while he was in town for the Supernova conference. This was pretty exciting for me as he has been a core inspiration for my intellectual and professional pursuits of the last 3+ years.
I was first turned on to Umair’s work via Fred Wilson. Once I read a few of Umair’s pieces on Bubblegeneration, I was immediately blown away by his combination of writing skill, extreme econogeekery, and keen insight into pop culture and the human condition. He presented a really compelling framework for how to make sense out of the media and technology environments I had been working in (and continue to), so it struck a chord, to say the least.
A good bit of what he was writing about (network economics, game theory, social capital, etc) was just over my head enough to get me obsessed with understanding it. Over the course of a several months, I went through and read every single thing he had ever posted to Bubblegeneration, along the way buying and reading books about the above-mentioned subjects, reading everything he linked to, and scouring Wikipedia for definitions of things I wasn’t familiar with.
I sometimes refer to this as my self-directed MBA. It was the perfect way and perfect timing for me to study some forward-looking business economics after finishing my MFA, which was extremely self-directed as well. I had learned how to apply and discipline my curiosity at CalArts, so my broadband connection + these influences = a total field day for many months.
Around the same time, another major intellectual/professional influence in my life had turned me on to Yochai Benkler’s work and also Bruce Sterling. So this was a period of really intense learning as you can imagine.
Fast forwarding to this week, the actual hang (also featuring Chris Golda, Jonathan Strauss, and Jonathan’s friend Loren) met my [wild] expectations: some drinks, some analysis of various agreed-upon douchebags, some discussion of solutions to some problems, and plenty of jokes. Everyone involved was super hilarious (Umair included) so that was key to the fun.
I’ll get into some more details later, but of the things that I was reminded of was, ironically, tied to the ever-present “social media” phenomenon. Typically I try to stay away from talking about social media in the abstract as those conversations (occurring online especially) in the aggregate have not changed at all in years.
The thing that I was reminded of is that there are many things that these new media technologies can do to make people better off, but they require specific application to specific problems…not just the meta-problem of media itself. That’s why I think social media is “under hyped”, because few have really executed strategies that take advantage of the broader implications and opportunities of hyperconnectivity (also note The Shift Index).
What I mean by that is: things like StockTwits and Hello Health and Lend4Health and eduFire and awe.sm and Topspin are about 80 billion times more valuable and interesting than, say, AdMob (here’s a nice post from Umair explaining why).
A lot of people are spending their time figuring out how new ways to connect buyers and vendors so they can engage in the same old transaction. But what we really need are new kinds of transactions and new roles for economic actors (check out Doc Searls VRM project for an example and Eric von Hippel generally).
Social media tools are just that: tools. Here’s hoping more people start using them to build a better plane/train/couch/IRA/classroom, instead of wringing their hands over advertising*.
(**note that social media conversations are a substitute for advertising. But you knew that, because read this incredibly on-point paper by Umair, right? ;-)
This ecosystem thus, without some form of strong mediation, resembles not so much the democratic system that the whuffophiles imagine, but is potentially more like a Feudal system with robber barons and their bands roaming round the social net mugging defenceless digital peasants (or at the very least lording it over them and forcing acquiescence to their ways).
(via Karma Chameleons and the danger of whuffie based feudal systems - broadstuff)
Based on my facile understanding of game theory, I’ll posit that if all social capital influencing actions are networked (i.e. one action influences the value of another action) and visible to other game players, then that is all the mediation the system needs.
Santa brought me a textbook on game theory called Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (Roger B. Myerson, Harvard, 1991) that I just cracked open this weekend. I bumped into some pretty serious calculus on page seven and am going to have to re-up on sets, vectors, functions and limits before I get much more out of this book. That’s kind of a downer (because of a lack of time) but also very exciting.
At any rate, those first six pages contain more than a few pithy sentences that sum up why I’ve gotten so excited about game theory and why it’s so applicable to the future of organization design (and, yes, even what some might call “social media marketing” ;-).
Here are a few favorites so far (that will also serve as context for some forthcoming thoughts):
“Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers” (page 1)
“Much of the appeal and promise of game theory is derived from its position in the mathematical foundations of the social sciences.” (page 1)
“In the language of game theory, a ‘game’ refers to any social situation involving two or more individuals.” (page 2)
“When we analyze a game…we saythat a player in the game is “intelligent” if he knows everything that we know about the game and he can make any inferences about the situation that we can make [as social scientists]” (page 4)
re: software, this quote in particular says a lot about a) the benefits of simplicity/obvious affordances and b) behaviors in complex UX
“If a theory predicts that some individuals will be systematically fooled or led into making costly mistakes, then this theory will tend to lose its validity when these individuals learn to better understand the situation. The importance of game theory in the social sciences is largely derived from this fact.” (page 5)
That one sums up that last 10 years of Cluetrain-ish blogosphere hand-wringing in about 50 words, doesn’t it?
“Why should I expect that any simple quantitative model can give a reasonable description of people’s behavior? The fundamental results of decision theory directly address this question, by showing that any decision-maker who satisfies certain intuitive axioms should always behave so as to maximize the mathematical expected value of some utility function, with respect to some subjective probability distribution. That is, any rational decision-maker’s behavior should be describable by a ‘utility function’, which gives a quantitative characterization of his preferences for outcomes or prizes, and a ‘subjective probablity distribution’, which characterizes his beliefs about all relevant unknown factors.”
We cannot organize tomorrow’s businesses - or economy - like yesterday’s.
What do I mean?
Simple. How should we organize and manage how firms interact with consumers?
The Economist thinks it’s “creepy” but cool to trick consumers, because it’s profitable.
Is it?
Why (Real) Relationships Matter - Umair Haque
Rest assured: a lifetime of econometrics, game theory, interviews, primary research, consulting, PhD’s, and beyond went into that [rather pithy] rhetorical question.
…if the blog is being used to do the same job as the advertising without adding any extra value, it will have the same level of trust. Add to the value of the conversation, and the trust will go up.
To underpin this we turn to Game Theory, specifically the concept of Strong Tells in signalling a willingness to co-operate.Tthe stronger your demonstrated commitment, your willingness to disclose to the other party (the user), the more they are inclined to trust you.
Report Sounds Alarm on Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction - washingtonpost.com
Maybe it’s because I’ve been sitting around reading books about game theory and the Cold War for the last few weeks, but it seems worthwhile to consider: how do we prevent nuclear/biological attacks in a world of perfect information?
I know that the barriers are really REALLY high in terms of making a useable bomb, but it’s still worth considering at this early date.
Not to be a Debbie Downer or anything…
Game Theory — Open Yale Courses
Ta-da!
I haven’t dug in here too much yet, but I recommend [Yale prof] Barry Nalebuff’s Co-opetition and Thinking Strategically, too. Great reads…
It might seem that when two persons’ interests are not completely opposed—where by their actions they can increase the common good—it would be even easier to come to a rational solution. In fact it is often harder, and such solutions may be less satisfying.
I picked this up at the library yesterday and haven’t been able to put it down. Prisoner’s Dilemma, by William Poundstone is a perfect mixture of the intellectual history of game theory, an introduction to game theory, and the [suspenseful] geopolitical strategizing that happened around Los Alamos —> The Cold War.
I’ll try to pull quotes out of it as much as possible, but I’d recommend this book strongly to anyone. It’s extremely fun to read.
“Stories are everywhere about people like Microsoft’s Steve Ballmer finally realizing that Congress wasn’t going to get the urgency of the current credit market problems without prodding from companies perceived to well away from the financial nexus.”
One thing I always marvelled at when I was doing my trading job was the ~24hour clairvoyance of really smart contrarian investors. If you go back and watch Paul K’s commentary over the last few weeks, reality has about a 24-48 hour lag ;-)
There’s a concept in game theory called strategyproofness, which essentially means that the rules of the game give you the incentive to reveal your true preferences (regardless of whether or not other players are doing the same).
This is what being ‘not evil’ is really all about - telling the truth about your strategy. It’s powerful because it forces you to focus on innovation, instead of gaming the system.
The interesting question is why some tech markets are strategyproof - whereas others (think MS) clearly aren’t. I think the answer has something to do with this: as disruption accelerates, truth-telling becomes a dominant strategy because gaming the system leaves you worse off in the long run, by making your decisions over time inconsistent.
You can think of this as a repeated game where outcomes are path-dependent because both rules and decisions have a memory.